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Abstract 
Quantitative risk assessment is a crucial step in safety analysis of process 
systems. Advancement of modern technologies has resulted in availability of 
large volume of process data. This tendency urges the need of developing new 
risk assessment approaches. Fault tree (FT), a conventional risk analysis 
method, is found to be ineffective in dynamic risk analysis and data analytics 
due to its static nature and reliance on experts‟ judgment in developing stage. 
The use of artificial neural network (ANN) in risk assessment of process 
systems is not a new concept. ANN is a structured model that is built upon data 
samples and learning algorithms to process complex input/output data in the 
way that it is trained. The application of ANN can help to overcome some of the 
limitations of FT. The dynamic and data-driven nature, independency on prior 
information on events relationships, and less reliance on experts‟ judgement are 
the advantages of ANN over FT. However, there is limited work on the 
development of ANN-based risk assessment models using the conventional 
methods such as FT as an informative base. This study proposes a methodology 
of mapping FT into ANN to support convenient and effective application of 
ANN in risk assessment. The proposed method is demonstrated through its 
application to failure analysis of one of the causes of Tesoro Anacortes Refinery 
accident. The results of network‟s accident modelling performance have shown 
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that the ANN model (mapped from the FT) is an effective risk assessment 
technique in terms of application for estimation of the TE failure probability.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1 Past Accidents in Chemical Process Industries 
Modern tendencies of sophistication and digitalization in the current 
process systems have resulted in increase of their performance in terms of 
productivity and efficiency of data utilization. Nevertheless, this progress carries 
a considerable risk of failure in process systems (Adedigba et al., 2017). These 
failures may result in catastrophic accidents with human and assets losses, such 
as:  
 The Bhopal Disaster (1984) with immediate deaths of 3800 people caused 
by accidental release of around 40 tons of toxic methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas 
(Broughton E., 2005); 
 The Arco Chemical Company plant accident (1990) resulted in 17 death 
from explosion of flammable gas mixture in water storage tank during 
maintenance operations (Ainsworth and Lepkowski, 1990); 
 The BP Texas Refinery accident (2005) with 15 workers killed by ignition 
and explosion of flammable hydrocarbon vapor cloud released due to 
overflow in isomerization unit (CSB, 2007); and 
 The Deepwater Horizon blowout accident in the Gulf of Mexico (2010) 
resulted in 11 deaths and the largest marine oil spill in human history 
(Adedigba et al., 2017).  
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The development of the Safety Engineering as a separate field of study 
itself and numerous recommendations to the specific processes, procedures, 
equipment and materials standards etc. are the results of the investigation of 
such accidents (Crowl and Louvar, 2011). The accident investigation process 
typically requires the use of special techniques or approaches to determine the 
causes and scenario of the accident. 
1.2 Process Safety Assessment and Management 
Accidents often take place as a result of abnormal events occurred in 
complex and nonlinear interactions between the elements of process systems 
including equipment, personnel, organizational structure, environmental 
conditions, etc. (Adedigba et al. 2016). This trend has led the chemical process 
industry to the incorporation of safety management in systems design, operation 
and control stage and to the development of effective risk assessment tools.  
Process safety management (PSM) is mainly focused on the prevention 
and mitigation of process accidents that are presented in chemical industry 
mainly by fires, explosions and toxic releases. PSM usually starts from the 
identification of a system‟s existing hazards. The hazard identification methods 
include checklists, surveys, hazards and operability studies (HAZOP), safety 
reviews, etc. (Crowl and Louvar, 2011). These approaches help to perform 
effective and detailed analysis of risks associated with equipment, hazardous 
materials and procedures.  
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Risk is defined as „a potential of loss‟ that occurs due to activity of human 
or natural processes. Loss is mainly described by damage to human life, 
environment, equipment and days outage (Modarres, 2006). Risk assessment 
techniques are applied to selected hazards in order to identify incidents and 
analyze the consequences. They aim to estimate the probability and the 
magnitude of potential losses from an accident. After the possible accident 
scenarios are identified, their corresponding occurrence probabilities and 
consequences are predicted using risk assessment models. Those models that 
include consequences magnitude determination are termed as quantitative risk 
analysis (QRA); while the models that only deal with probability estimation are 
called probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods (Crowl and Louvar, 2011). 
Safety management is applied in order to establish the correct procedures 
that allow prediction, minimization and control of losses occurred due to risk 
exposure (Modarres, 2006). The tools applicable in safety management include 
legal policies development, equipment and procedures standards establishment, 
development of operations instructions, control measures, etc. (Crowl and 
Louvar, 2011).   
The continuing occurrence of these catastrophic accidents indicates that 
the development of process safety analysis approaches is unable to keep pace 
with the rapid technological development. This urges the need of research to 
advancement of safety analysis tools. Last decades have seen a number of 
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studies on accident analysis and prediction (Adedigba et al., 2016; Ruilin and 
Lowndes, 2010; Zhang et al., 2018), process safety analysis (Khakzad et al., 
2011; Kang et al., 2008; Diez, 2007), fault prediction and classification (Nagpal 
and Brar, 2014; Li et al., 2018), probabilistic risk assessment (Yang et al., 2015; 
Unnikrishnan et al., 2014), and etc. Risk assessment is an essential component 
of these approaches. The use of risk assessment methods in process safety 
assessment allows identifying hazards, performing accident causes and 
consequences analysis, and modeling the accident (Crowl and Louvar, 2011). 
1.3 Risk Assessment Methods 
Qualitative risk assessment approaches, such as hazard identification 
(HAZID) and hazard and operability (HAZOP) are used to identify potential 
hazards, possible accident causes, and potential solutions in process system 
design. Quantitative risk analysis (QRA) approaches aim to quantify the 
probabilities and consequences of accidents (Khakzad et al., 2013; Adedigba et 
al., 2017; Yang et al., 2015). The main advantage of the quantitative risk 
analysis is consideration of both frequency and severity in a more 
comprehensive mode with determination of likelihood of accident occurrence 
and their loss. The use of these approaches in accident scenario analysis allows 
evaluating the system failure risk probability and accident consequences in 
process systems. The results of the application of these methods include the 
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development of such risk assessment tools as proper safety barriers, operation 
standards, and design solutions, etc.   
Layer of protection analysis (LOPA) is a semi-quantitative method used 
for risk assessment. It characterizes and categorizes the consequences and 
evaluation of layers of protection efficiency for the identified accident scenarios. 
Its results are more conservative in comparison with QRA in terms of the 
assessment of uncertainties associated with accident modelling (Crowl and 
Louvar, 2011). 
Accident models are the main risk assessment tools that represent 
theoretical structure of selected scenario. These models are used for 
systemization and evaluation of the accident root causes and their corresponding 
effects. By using accident models, the experts are able to identify the accident 
causes and track failure routes.  Accidents models can be classified in number of 
ways depending on the purpose of use, which include fault tree (FT), event tree 
(ET), bow-tie (BT), and Bayesian network (BN) (Adedigba et al. 2016).  
FT is a deductive approach which allows determining and classifying the 
occurrence probability of accident called top event (TE). FT is a schematic 
representation of accident occurrence scenarios represented by combination of 
components called basic events (BE) and logical gates that form a system that 
triggers the top event (Crowl and Louvar, 2011). FT can be easily computed 
using various software tools as the logical gates follow the Boolean logic rules. 
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Also, minimal cut sets, failure probabilities and graphical constructions can be 
obtained. However, several disadvantages of FT complicate the application of 
this method in chemical process industry. For example, the FT developer can 
never be certain that all failure modes have been considered as for any 
complicated process the fault tree will be enormous (thousands of BEs and 
gates). Also, no assumption of stressing of components on each other and no 
assumption of partial failure of component are considered in FT.  Finally, 
structure and results of trees made by different people are different for the same 
process as its structure is totally based on expertise‟s judgment. 
ET is inductive technique that is aimed on determination and 
quantification of occurrence probability of specific post-accident consequences 
(Crowl and Louvar, 2011). The analysis begins with initiating event and is used 
to evaluate consequences prevention barriers. ETs can be easily computed using 
various software tools with the use of reference libraries for different types of 
equipment. Therefore, possible modification in process design can be done in 
order to improve the safety. However, ET does not provide the framework to 
evaluate whether the selected safeguards are sufficient. Single orientation of tree 
as only one initiating event is studied while independency of barriers‟ function is 
assumed in analysis which is not true in real process systems. This aspect of ET 
can be considered as a main disadvantage of the method as it does not provide 
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certainty that particular consequences have taken place due to occurrence of 
selected failure (Rausand and Hoyland, 2004).  
BT is an approach combing FT and ET. Thus, it is both inductive and 
deductive. This allows the experts connecting the causes of an accident to its 
consequences. BT represents the whole scenario of an accident where the central 
element is top event of fault tree and initiating event of event tree. This 
schematic can give a clear picture of the threat controls and consequences. It 
demonstrates the links between accident causes, loss events, conditional events 
and outcome events (Yan et al., 2016). However, the application of BT carries 
drawbacks of the use of both FT and ET described above.  
1.4 Objectives and Aims 
To overcome the limitations of conventional risk assessment methods, 
artificial neural network (ANN) can be applied in risk assessment of process 
systems. This study aims to investigate the development and application of 
ANN-based models for the risk assessment of process systems. The main 
objectives are: 
 To develop the implementation and mapping algorithms to covert fault tree 
(FT) to ANN by using FT as an informative base; 
 To study the performance ANN as a risk assessment tool; and  
 To demonstrate application of the ANN-based risk assessment approach 
through the Tesoro Anacortes Refinery explosion accident. 
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1.5 Thesis Structure 
The remaining part of this manuscript is organized as follows. Chapter 2 
presents an overview of the main aspects of ANNs and its comparisons with 
other risk assessment approaches. The mapping methodology is proposed in 
Chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents the application of the proposed approach. The 
results of the application and corresponding analysis are given in Chapter 5. 
Finally, Chapter 6 is devoted to the conclusions and recommendations for future 
work. 
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
2.1 Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Process Systems 
Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is a methodology applied for 
translating accident initiators into risk profiles. The accident initiator is usually a 
failure that occurs with likelihood that can be decreased by performing 
preventive actions. As the failure takes place, the consequence barriers are 
applied in order to mitigate the losses and corresponding consequences 
occurrence risk profiles. Therefore, PRA can predict the main accident scenarios 
with some level of accuracy depending on the characteristics of selected 
technique (Kumamoto and Henley, 1996). However, the predictive ability of 
PRA approach is considered to be highest from the known methodologies 
(vonHerrmann and Wood, 1989).  
FT is a conventional failure analysis tool of PRA, which allows 
determining and analyzing the occurrence probability of a system failure, i.e., 
TE. The strength of FT is that it provides a structured and graphical 
representation of failure analysis of complex systems along with the capability 
of failure probability quantification (Clifton A. Ericson II, 2000). This deductive 
method is able to analyze various occurrence scenarios of selected undesired 
events. The application of FT in risk assessment has the following weakness: 
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 FT is static in nature and it cannot perform structural adaptation to model 
dynamic development of process failures (Khakzad et al., 2013); 
 FT cannot consider the cases of component partial failure. In the cases of 
partially working equipment, it is assumed that this component completely 
fails (Baig et al., 2013);   
 The interactions and interdependency among system components are not 
considered in FT as all basic events are treated as independent events (Bobbio 
et al., 2001; Khakzad et al., 2011); 
 The experts‟ knowledge and their assessment may be incomplete and biased. 
FT does not include all modes of system failure that can take place during 
operation (Crowl and Louvar, 2011); and  
 A FT for a complex system with thousands of events and gates is challenging 
to handle in data analytics of process systems. 
Another probabilistic risk assessment technique that combines both 
qualitative and quantitative study of the system is ET. It is an inductive 
procedure that is based on binary logic which implies that event has or has not 
happened or failure of system component called barrier has or has not taken 
place. Then, possible outcomes are considered during analysis and 
corresponding level of risk is possible to be estimated via use probability of 
failure data for barriers (Rausand and Hoyland, 2004). An ET starts from 
initiating event (IE) that results in activation of first barrier and basing on 
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success or failure of it, two corresponding branches are shown. Then, the 
procedure repeats for following barriers depending on the system structure; 
therefore, probability of failure data for each barrier is required for quantitative 
analysis of the accident consequences. ET is useful for determination of multiple 
failures, probabilistic calculations, identification of system effectiveness and its 
weaknesses. The drawbacks list of this method includes single orientation of tree 
as only one initiating event is studied. Also, the barriers‟ function is considered 
to be independent on each other and thus there is possibility of missing the 
component failures. Additionally, binary logic that is used by this technique is 
not applicable for scenarios that include uncertain or partial parameters such as 
human error, environmental conditions etc. 
Bow-tie analysis is the PRA method applied in the case of the requirement 
of total analysis of the accident scenario starting from the basic events of FT and 
ending with the consequences of the ET. The theoretical framework which is 
result of BT analysis consists from two parts that are represented by FT and ET 
where TE and initiating event coincide. Consequently, the application of this 
risk assessment technique carries the advantages and disadvantages of both FT 
and ET.  
There are several other methods used in quantitative risk assessment in 
order to deal with the drawbacks of FT and ET. Bayesian networks (BN) have 
shown to be a powerful technique for analysis of systems with complex 
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structures under uncertainty. A typical BN consists of nodes and directed arcs. 
The probabilistic relationships and interdependencies are shown in BN using 
parent and child nodes. For each child node, a conditional probability table is 
used to shown the relationship with its parent nodes. One of the main advantages 
of BN modeling is reduction of uncertainty by implementation of new data to 
update the event probabilities in a dynamic mode (Onisko et al., 2001). BNs are 
also capable of qualitatively representing the causal-effect relationship of a 
complex system failure or an accident.  
2.2 Artificial Neural Network  
Recent development of computational tools allows the creation and 
utilization of artificial models of biological neural networks that are graphically 
represented by ordered and interconnected neurons to compute the output from 
the input. These neurons are organized in a layered structure called multilayer 
perceptron (MLP). MLP is a feedforward network structure that consists from 
neurons of 3 types: neurons of input layer, neurons of hidden layers and neurons 
of output layer. The output of each neuron from the previous layer is one of the 
inputs to each neuron of the following layer where specific transfer function is 
applied to input signal of each neuron (Illias et al., 2015). The performance of an 
ANN model is mainly dependent on selection of input and output data sets, and 
network architecture (Seifeddine et al., 2012). An example of a typical ANN 
structure with single output is shown in Figure 2.1 (Ele and Adesola, 2013). The 
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input signal from neurons of input layer are transferred through the weighed 
connections to all neurons of the hidden layer 1. The transferred signals are 
summed in each neuron of the hidden layer 1 with corresponding bias; then, the 
result is utilized in neuron activation function. The activation functions of 
hidden layer neurons are usually represented by bounded, continuous non-linear 
functions (e.g. logarithm sigmoid or hyperbolic tangent sigmoid) (Chitsazan et 
al., 2015).  The activation function of the neurons of output layer is typically 
linear and is used for summing the incoming signal for output (Figure 2.1). 
 
Figure 2.1 An example of a neuron in a typical structure of Artificial Neural Network 
(Ele and Adesola, 2013) 
 
ANNs are used in variety of fields as the characteristics of them provide 
opportunity to interpolate and extrapolate expertise and analytical data; also, 
they are found to be useful in operation of systems with highly non-linear 
functional relationships. Also, ANNs carry an advantage of considering any 
linear and non-linear interaction between system components due to specificity 
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of network design and training process (Zhenyuan et al., 2000). ANNs are 
implemented as an accident modelling method in risk assessment due to their 
advantages over conventional methods in terms of independence on expert‟s 
judgement, non-linearity modelling, interdependencies identification etc. Also, it 
was proven that in some of the implementation cases, ANNs can continuously 
modify network parameters to new states and train from actual site data (Gracia 
et al., 2005).   
2.2.1 Learning Algorithm 
Training and testing are two main steps after the ANN architecture has 
been specified (i.e., parameters and data sets specification). The MLP learning 
algorithms, such as backpropagation method, are used for tuning suitable 
weights of each neuron in order to increase accuracy of network output signal to 
satisfy pre-defined constrains (Lippmann, 1987). The backpropagation 
algorithm implies the performance of two-step iterations where the first forward 
step computes the results and second backward step is conducted for error 
calculations and weights updating. The iterations are performed until the error 
function reaches the pre-defined goal tolerance value (Basheer and Hajmeer, 
2000). Among the list of functions used for overall error minimization such as 
sum squared error (SSE), mean squared error (MSE) and mean absolute 
deviation (MAD), the MSE performance function is the most widely used. Its 
expression is given by Eq. (1): 
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∑                  
  
            (1) 
where YT is the target output of the network, n is the number of samples. 
Each training instance increases the network performance in terms of 
calculation accuracy and makes it suitable for simulation application. Finally, 
the mathematical representation of the prediction performance of a feedforward 
MLP is given by Eq. (2) and (3) (Chitsazan et al., 2015): 
            ∑                             (2) 
       ∑                   (3) 
where Qjk is the output of j
th
 neuron of the hidden layer, f1 is neuron 
transfer function, bj is the bias for neurons of hidden layer, wij and wj are weights 
values of connections between the layers, iik is the value of input for the k
th
 input 
vector, Qk is the kth predicted probability of failure, b is value of bias for 
neurons of output layer. 
2.2.2 Cross validation and early stopping 
The training of ANN is associated with the potential of „overtraining‟ of 
the model. This problem occurs when the predictive power of the model is 
considerable for the data given in training set. However, the model simulations 
on data out of the training dataset show significantly less accurate results 
(Adedigba et al., 2017).  In order to avoid „overtraining‟, cross validation and 
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early stopping techniques are used during training. The cross-validation method 
uses a separate validation data set. The simulations of the data from validation 
set called „validation checks‟ are performed during the training and 
corresponding error of prediction is observed. In the early stopping method, 
training is stopped as soon as the error in the validation check is higher than it 
was checked last time (Chen et al., 2017).  The application of these techniques 
helps to avoid the „overtraining‟ phenomena and increase generalization 
capability of ANN models. 
2.2.3 Network Testing and Application 
The testing data set is used to evaluate the agreement between the network 
and target outputs. For this purpose, such indexes as regression coefficients are 
used (Illias et al., 2015). Failure analysis model for process systems can be 
developed in the form of ANN, which considers the interconnections of each 
specified parameter and element. It can also be further updated by performing 
additional training. 
The application of ANNs in safety engineering is found to be effective in 
variety of cases where the quantitative risk assessment was required (Illias et al., 
2015, Ruilin and Lawndes 2010). Consequently, ANNs are supposed to solve 
problems associated with subjectivity and models complexity, partial 
dependence and stressing effects of existing risk management techniques. 
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2.3 Application of ANN in Risk Assessment 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) are used in variety of fields; because 
they are able to interpolate and extrapolate expertise and analytical data (Illias et 
al., 2015). ANNs are capable of modeling linear and non-linear interactions 
between system components through the application of different linear and non-
linear transfer functions in neurons along with various training algorithms. 
(Zhenyuan et al., 2000). Parameters of ANNs can be updated to new states of 
contributory factors and train from actual site data (Gracia et al., 2005). Li et al. 
(2018) have developed a neural network model that is capable of predicting the 
CO2 leakage probability from wells using data from actual oil fields in Texas 
USA. It is found that their proposed method that couples FT with ANN can be 
used as an effective tool in prediction of coal and gas outbursts in mining 
industry (Ruilin and Lawndes, 2010). In these works, ANN is either used 
independently or in combination with other conventional approach like FT and 
bow-tie analysis in order to obtain system failure probabilities. ANN models are 
capable to learn from the newly available data to update the network‟s 
parameters and improve their performance in dynamic processes risk estimation 
(Li and Lian, 2007). ANNs do not require information on the relationship 
between input and output variables; therefore, there is minor dependence on 
expert‟s judgment on process structure and/or on complex schemes of process 
components interrelationships (Shahin et al., 2001). However, there are number 
of crucial aspects in ANN modeling that significantly influence on the network‟s 
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performance including data analysis, neurons settings, and etc. (Sheela and 
Deepa, 2013). 
The application of ANNs in risk assessment is not new. It has been widely 
applied to areas including fault classification (Nagpal and Brar, 2014; Ruilin and 
Lowndes, 2010), fault identification (Jafari et al., 2014), and accident modeling 
and prediction (Illias et al., 2015; Adedigba et al., 2017). Li et al. (2018) have 
developed neural network model that can be used for prediction of CO2 leakage 
risk in oil fields in Texas USA. Ruilin and Lowndes (2010) have applied 
coupled ANN and FT model for the prediction of coal and gas outburst 
accidents. It is crucial in ANN modeling to properly set the parameters of ANN 
that includes hidden layer neurons number, neurons transfer function, training 
algorithm, etc. (Sheela and Deepa, 2013). Improper settings or use of incorrectly 
formed datasets can result in problems of overfitting and underfitting (problems 
of excess and lack of information processing capacity correspondingly). 
2.4 Comparison of ANN with Conventional PRA Methods 
FT and ET are developed based on experts‟ knowledge and understanding 
on possible causes and consequences of system failures. The performance of 
these two techniques are highly dependent on the appropriateness of experts‟ 
judgement. ANN is a data-driven model that is built and set according to the 
learning algorithms and training datasets (Adedigba et al., 2017). Although 
some of the ANN‟s structure elements still need to be defined by the model 
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developer, the key parameters of the network (i.e., connection weights) are 
learned from data sets.  
The basic events in a FT and the top events (safety barrier events) in an 
ET are considered independent with Boolean logic operators (i.e., either failure 
or success). The interactions among the events, their multiple states, and 
nonlinearity are ignored in both models. As ANNs are data-driven models and 
utilizes the numerical methods with nonlinear functions, they can „learn‟ non-
linear interactions between the input and output variables of the model 
(Adedigba et al., 2017).  
In comparison with FT, ET and BT, ANNs can utilize different types of 
information (e.g., failure probability and operation data, process data) at the 
same time. Although ANN-based models can be applied to the probability 
assessment of system failures and their consequences; however, the ANN model 
structure and configurations provide no significant information about the causal-
effect relationships.  
BN is able to explicitly represent the dependencies of cause and effects, 
update probabilities, handle uncertainties, and incorporate multi-state variables. 
It has been found more effective than FT in risk assessment (Khakzad et al., 
2011; Yang et al., 2015). Similar to ANN, BN also uses directed graphs. The 
structure of BN itself presents valuable information about conditional 
dependence between the variables; while ANN does not provide such 
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interpretation. However, one obvious advantage of ANN over BN is that ANN 
can model the correlation between input variables; while BN assumes that all 
input variables (i.e., variable states) are independent. This explains why ANN is 
chosen in this study. 
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Chapter 3 – Methodology 
The proposed method consists of the implementation process (Figure 3.1), 
graphical mapping algorithm (Figure 3.2) and mapping rules. The main steps 
and rules are described below. 
 
Figure 3.1 Implementation process of the proposed method 
 
3.1 Hazard Analysis and Development of Fault Tree 
Hazard analysis includes hazard identification and scenario identification. 
Varieties of methods can be used, which include process hazards checklists, 
hazard and operability (HAZOP), etc. FT is used to identify ways in which the 
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identified hazards can cause system failures or accidents. Causes are being 
deductively identified and are put in a graphical form of tree as intermediate or 
basic events depending on their possibility to be developed further. Both IEs and 
BEs are connected with each other with the use of „gates‟ which are Boolean 
logic operators „OR‟ or „AND‟ or others.  Failure probabilities of BEs are being 
estimated using statistical analysis of historical failure rate data or experts‟ 
judgments. The failure probability of tree components connected using „AND‟ 
and „OR‟ gate are calculated by Eq. (4) and Eq. (5), respectively. 
   ∏   
 
                     (4) 
   ∏       
 
           (5) 
FT is used to identify causes of a system failure. These causes (BEs) are 
used as input variables in the ANN to be developed. In the proposed method, the 
application of FT helps to identify or select input variables in ANN. 
3.2 Graphical Mapping Algorithm 
The elements of a FT are transformed into the components of an ANN in 
the step of graphical mapping. The basic events (BEs), and the TE of a FT are 
mapped to be the input and output neurons of an ANN, respectively. The BEs 
correspond to the neurons of the first layer; while the TE becomes the output of 
the ANN. The mathematical functions of the logic gates and intermediate events 
(IEs) of the FT are utilized as the synaptic weights and transfer functions in the 
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ANN. For example, the „AND‟ logic gate with 2 inputs can be simulated with 2 
input neurons and 1 output neuron with step transfer function of specified 
threshold and bias with synaptic weight. Transfer function threshold and 
synaptic weight values are estimated during training stage using learning 
algorithms. However, there is no mathematical relationship between the synaptic 
weights and logic gates with IEs. They are determined during the training stage 
through input and output data. Thus, the number of neurons in the network‟s 
first layer is specified based on the number of the BEs; while the network output 
is presented by a single neuron. This step is required in order to classify and 
prepare the data that will be used in the following steps. 
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Figure 3.2 Graphical mapping algorithm from FT to ANN 
 
3.3 Configuration of ANN Parameters 
This step aims to define the ANN parameters including: a) number of 
hidden layers and their neurons, b) transfer function of each layer, and c) 
learning algorithm. The proper configuration of these parameters helps to avoid 
the over-fitting and under-fitting problems. Network over-fitting refers to the 
disability of a network to generalize the data that it is trained for. The 
information processing capacity of such networks is too large, so amount of data 
in training set is not enough to train all of the neurons in hidden layers. The 
under-fitting problem occurs when the model is not able to classify the data that 
it is trained with. There is not sufficient number of neurons in hidden layers for 
adequate detection of signals or specific patterns in complex data sets. There are 
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many rule-of-thumb methods for determining an appropriate number of neurons 
to use in the hidden layers in order to avoid over and under-fitting. The 
following rules are proposed based on FT structure and rules provided in 
Panchal and Panchal (2017): 
(1) The number of neurons in hidden layers is required to be between the 
number of neurons in the input layer and the number in the output layer 
(i.e., 1). 
(2) The number of hidden neurons should be 2/3 of the number of neurons in 
the input layer, plus the number of neurons in the output layer (i.e., 1). 
(3) The number of neurons in the first hidden layer should be equivalent to 
the number of IEs directly linked to BEs in FT if the above-two rules are 
satisfied.  
(4) The number of neurons in the second hidden layer should be equivalent to 
the number of IEs directly linked to TE in FT. If the second rule is not 
satisfied, the number of neurons in the first hidden layer should be: the 
maximum allowed total number of hidden neurons minus the number of 
IEs directly linked to the TE. 
The above-rules are tested and validated in Chapter 5.  
The number of hidden layers is determined according to the model 
requirement. In absence of hidden layers, the model is only able to represent 
linear functions or dependencies. The network with one hidden layer can usually 
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simulate any function that represents a mapping of data from one specified set to 
another. The ANN with two hidden layers is capable of approximation of given 
boundary of arbitrary accuracy using linear and non-linear transfer functions. It 
is able to approximate any smooth mapping to any accuracy. The ANN with 
three and more hidden layers is rarely implemented due to high network 
complexity and long total training time without sufficient increase of efficiency 
(Heaton, 2017; Karsoliya, 2012). Therefore, two hidden layers are chosen in this 
proposed mapping method. 
3.4 Network Training 
The ANN training process is the crucial part in ANN creation because 
ANN is data driven model. The training is performed via providing the data on 
the input and the corresponding output variables of studied process. The 
backpropagation training algorithm is applied to the networks elements in order 
to adjust the connection weights. The passages of the signals from the inputs to 
the outputs and backwards during training are observed and corresponding 
errors in prediction are used for adjustment of the weights (Adedigba et al., 
2017). Therefore, the accuracy and objectivity of the training data is important 
for the whole training process of the ANNs. 
Mapping FT into ANN requires the use of non-linear log-sigmoid transfer 
function for neurons in hidden layers and linear transfer function for output 
layer. The use of log-sigmoid transfer functions in hidden layers enables 
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learning nonlinear relationships between input and output vectors in the training 
of ANNs. The linear transfer function of output neuron is used for function 
fitting purposes (The MathWorks, 2018). Therefore, the network processes the 
input from each node according to the specified parameters settings. Learning 
algorithm is required for training purposes. The suggested technique is 
Levenberg–Marquardt backpropagation algorithm that is widely used in the 
literature (Lippman, 1987). This algorithm processes the input data in a network 
in forward direction and then the output is compared with given data. The 
difference in values is processes in backward direction for updating each 
connection‟s weight and neurons biases in order to minimize the error. The 
Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm applies the Jacobian in the iterative calculations 
which requires the use of mean or sum of squared errors as a performance 
indicator. The mathematical expression of the Levenberg-Maqardt optimization 
is given by Eq (6) (Hagan and Menhaj, 1994): 
           
                       (6) 
Where J
T
 is the transpose Jacobian of the performance function with respect to 
weights and bias variables X, J
T
e is the matrix of all errors, I is the identity 
matrix and µ is the scalar value that is being adapted during training with each 
iteration in order to reduce the value of performance function to a specified 
value.  
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 The abovementioned process is repeated by the network during training 
stage to continuously improve the performance. One of the several conditions 
occurrence leads to the stop of the training process (The MathWorks, 2018):  
 Limit of iterations number is reached; 
 The maximum training time is exceeded; 
 Target value of the performance function is reached; 
 Adaptive value µ exceeds maximum magnitude; and  
 Increase of performance function values for specified number of times in a 
row on a validation dataset. 
When the actual data for the BEs is not sufficiently available, Monte-
Carlo simulation technique is proposed to generate the data for network training 
in this study. In this step, failure probability data of BEs can be generated based 
on their failure probability distributions whose types and parameters are 
determined by experts. The TE failure probabilities are calculated based on the 
generated BEs failure probabilities. The probability distribution can be derived 
from the calculated TE failure probabilities. The obtained probability 
distribution is used to generate random TE failure probability data applicable for 
training.  
3.5 Network Testing 
This step aims to check the performance of the developed ANN with 
testing data set. The main parameter used for determination of successful 
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mapping is the regression coefficient. The testing process consists of 
computation using the testing dataset in the network and comparison of the 
results with the actual output data. This step is crucial in the mapping process as 
these results can indicate the needs for additional data, changes in the network‟s 
structure, and whether the mapping is proper or not. 
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Chapter 4 – Case Study 
4.1 Description of the Andeavor Anacortes Refinery Explosion 
The Andeavor Anacortes Refinery (Tesoro Anacortes Refinery prior to 
2017) is located on March Point, Washington state in the U.S.A. The disaster 
took place on April 2, 2010 due to rupture of heat exchanger and ignition of the 
released flammable hydrogen and naphtha from the process unit. The rupture 
occurred on E-6600E heat exchanger in Catalytic Reformer/ Naphtha 
Hydrotreater unit (“the NHT unit”) during heat exchangers bank startup 
procedure. The consequent explosion and fire resulted in seven fatalities, assets 
and reputation losses of the company. This accident resulted in the largest 
human loss at United States petroleum refineries since the BP Texas City 
disaster in March 2005 (U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, 
2014). 
4.2 Application of the Proposed Method 
The proposed approach was applied to map the fault tree of release 
prevention barrier developed by Adedigba et al. (2016) for the Tesoro Anacortes 
Refinery accident. The analysis was performed based on the data and 
information from the accident investigation report presented by U.S. Chemical 
Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (2014). The fault tree of the release 
prevention barrier, one of the safety barriers used to prevent the fire and 
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explosion in the refinery, is presented in Figure 4.1. 21 basic events were used in 
the analysis and presented in Table 4.1.   
Table 4.1 Basic events description and failure probability data  
(Adopted from Adedigba et al. (2016)) 
BEs Event description Mean probability 
1 High temperature hydrogen attack (HTHA) 0.025 
2 Difficulty with valve operation during start up 0.015 
3 No report on leaks from heat exchanger during start up 0.050 
4 Hydrogen induced cold cracking 0.001 
5 Inexperience 0.010 
6 No permition on job carrying 0.010 
7 Failure of external supervision  0.083 
8 Incorrect procedure 0.005 
9 Poor construction material for NHT heat exchanger 0.010 
10 High mechanical stress 0.010 
11 Insufficient instrumentation to measure process conditions 0.001 
12 Long delay in inspection schedule 0.050 
13 Inadequate methods for detecting HTHA 0.090 
14 Inadequate training of the inspectors to detect HTHA easily 0.025 
15 Failure of HTHA inspection of heat exchanger 0.055 
16 Failure of detection of leaks from heat exchanger flanges 0.050 
17 Failure of minor release detection 0.050 
18 Wrong maintenance procedure (Nelson curve methodology) 0.005 
19 Delay maintenance operations 0.050 
20 HTHA degradation monitoring performed but failed to detect 0.066 
21 HTHA degradation monitoring specified but not performed 0.050 
 
The top event in the fault tree is the failure of release prevention barrier 
(RPB). The failure probability of top event according to the collected data is 
found to be 0.0842 with the use of developed FT and by computing the data for 
BEs. 
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Figure 4.1 Fault tree of release prevention barrier for heat exchanger in NHT unit 
 
4.2.1 Data Acquisition 
Equipment failure data needs to be collected at this stage. Due to the 
unavailability of actual site data, for illustrative purpose, a set of 500 random 
failure probabilities were generated for each one of the 21 BEs. Normal 
distributions (with means given by Table 4.1 and assumed 15% standard 
deviations) were adopted for the generation of failure probabilities. The 
probabilities of TE were generated based on the generated probabilities of BEs. 
Table 4.2 presents the data samples that were used for ANN training and testing 
in the case study. The division between testing and training sets was done using 
the principle of consistency and representativeness in order to avoid possible 
contradictions in simulations. 
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Table 4.2 Failure probability data for FT of release prevention barrier 
  BE1 BE2 BE3 BE4 BE5 … BE21 TE 
1 0.0260 0.0152 0.0462 0.0010 0.0098 … 0.0571 0.0896 
2 0.0259 0.0155 0.0536 0.0010 0.0094 … 0.0550 0.0961 
3 0.0257 0.0136 0.0711 0.0011 0.0125 … 0.0520 0.0893 
4 0.0219 0.0161 0.0563 0.0011 0.0096 … 0.0588 0.0787 
5 0.0231 0.0141 0.0567 0.0009 0.0111 … 0.0662 0.0927 
… … … … … … … … … 
499 0.0254 0.0123 0.0533 0.0010 0.0112 … 0.0560 0.0930 
500 0.0268 0.0151 0.0462 0.0011 0.0090 … 0.0435 0.0902 
 
4.2.2 ANN Development 
The ANN was developed based on the fault tree presented in Figure 4.1 
according to the graphical mapping (Figure 3.2) algorithm, implementation 
process (Figure 3.1), and corresponding mapping rules. 450 of the samples were 
used as training data and 50 samples were dedicated for testing of the ANN. All 
21 basic events were treated as input variables of the network; while the top 
event is used as the output of the model. The feedforward backpropagation type 
ANN with 2 hidden layers and 1 output layers was defined following the rules of 
thumb. The training function was set to be Levenberg-Marquardt 
backpropagation (trainlm) and performance function was set to MSE. Transfer 
functions of neurons in hidden neurons were logsig and linear for output layer. 
The validation checks were used to ensure the ability of network to generalize 
the input data. The training stopped when subset error rate increased for more 
than 10 epoch iterations in a row. The data generation, fault tree computations 
43 
 
and the creation of ANN models were computed using the neural network 
toolbox in Matlab R2014b. 
 
Figure 4.2 Developed ANN schematics 
 
4.2.3. Mapping Performance Check 
The developed ANN (Figure 4.2) was tested in order to simulate the FT with 
different input data and predict the failure probability of the top event. 50 cases 
of different BEs and corresponding TE failure probabilities were used for ANN 
testing. The results obtained from the ANN and FT models were compared and 
presented in Figure 4.3, which shows good matches. The mean, maximum and 
MSE of the differences between the results of these two models were also 
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calculated for mapping performance check: (a) mean difference is 0.41%, (b) 
maximum difference is 1.11%, and (c) MSE is 5.38E-06.  
 
Figure 4.3 Plot of RPB failure probability results for testing data set from FT and those 
obtained from ANN 
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Chapter 5 – Results and Discussion 
5.1 The Development of ANN with FT as the Base 
ANN models are trained using informative dataset by adjusting its internal 
parameters (synaptic weights and biases) in order to “memorize” the 
mathematical relationship between input and output variables. It is true that the 
ANN model can be developed without the use of FT as the base by providing 
necessary datasets for BEs and TE. However, identification of proper inputs of 
ANN models may be challenging in risk analysis of complex systems. It is more 
beneficial to use FTA to support ANN model development as it implies causal 
effect relationships that are useful for selection of inputs and outputs of ANN 
models.  
5.2 The Effect of Availability of New Data 
Given new data, the established ANN model can be updated to re-assess the 
system failure probability. A set of 50 new samples of BE and TE failure 
probabilities was generated as newly available data. The training of the 
developed ANN was performed using new data in order to update the network‟s 
weights of connections and biases. It has shown performance improvement as 
the mean and maximum differences decreased to 0.35% and 1.03%, 
respectively. The results show that the availability of new data can improve the 
accuracy of ANN-based mode for failure analysis. 
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5.3 The Effect of FT Structure Change 
The change of FT structure (e.g., addition of new BEs) was considered to 
study its influence on the ANN mapping process and its performance. Assuming 
that the presence of 20 BEs in the previous study was taken; all of the mapping 
steps were performed following the same algorithm as described above. The 
ANN consisted of 20 inputs, 7 first hidden layers, 4 second hidden layers and 1 
output neuron was created with the TE failure probability prediction 
performance characteristics of 0.45% for mean and 1.56% for maximum 
difference. The training dataset consisted of the same 450 failure probability 
samples excluding the samples of 21
st
 basic event. 
The addition of new 21
st
 BE was assumed with a new dataset for 50 failure 
probabilities of the 21
st
 BE and TE. The parameters of the present ANN (i.e., 
connection weights and biases) were used as initial estimates for those of the 
new ANN during the model setting step. The parameters for connections 
weights and bias for 21
st
 input neuron were set to default values. The mean and 
maximum differences of ANN with initial estimates for its parameters 
transferred from the existing ANN model are 0.13% and 0.70%, respectively. In 
the case of training of the same ANN without the parameter transfer, the mean 
and maximum difference is 0.41% and 1.11%, respectively. This indicates that it 
is more beneficial to transfer the parameters of the existing ANN to the new 
model corresponding to the change of FT. 
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5.4 Sensitivity Analysis of Outputs to Input Variables 
Sensitivity analysis has been performed to determine the critical contributory 
input variables on the model output. We adopted the profile approach proposed 
by Shojaeefard et al. (2013). This analysis investigated the change of RPB 
failure probability with respect to the input variation. Each input variable (BE 
failure probability) was divided into 20 equal intervals between its minimum 
and maximum values. All input variables except one were set 20 times at their 
minimum, first quartile, median, third quartile, and maximum values 
sequentially. For each scale point, 5 output results were obtained. The sum of 
them was divided by 5 to find the mean value. The same process was repeated 
for all input variables.  A contribution curve was obtained for each input 
variable. The comparisons of output profiles of all input variables were 
conducted. The magnitude of the output change along the scale is the main 
criterion for choosing the most important variable. For example, the comparison 
between the contribution of BE1 and BE2 is shown in Figure 5.1. The change of 
output along the scale of the variable of BE1 is greater than that of BE2. This 
can be explained by stronger influence of HTHA on RPB failure than “the 
difficulty with valve operation during start up”. Therefore, the BE1 is 
considered as more contributory to the TE in comparison with BE2. The same 
procedure was repeated for all 21 BEs in order to rank them according to their 
level of contribution to the TE. 
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Figure 5.1 Contribution profiles of BE1 and BE2 used in the ANN model for RPB, by 
the profile algorithm with a scale of 20 
 
The results of sensitivity analysis of contribution of all of the 21 BEs in 
RPB failure are reported in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1 BEs contribution ranking according to sensitivity analysis 
Rank of  
contribution 
BE 
number 
Event description 
1 12 Long delay in inspection schedule 
2 9 Poor construction material for NHT heat exchanger 
3 10 High mechanical stress 
4 11 
Insufficient instrumentation to measure process 
conditions 
5 7 Failure of external supervision  
6 3 No report on leaks from heat exchanger during start up 
7 20 
HTHA degradation monitoring performed but failed to 
detect 
8 1 High temperature hydrogen attack (HTHA) 
9 4 Hydrogen induced cold cracking 
10 2 Difficulty with valve operation during start up 
11 13 Inadequate methods for detecting HTHA 
12 15 Failure of HTHA inspection of heat exchanger 
13 16 
Failure of detection of leaks from heat exchanger 
flanges 
14 17 Failure of minor release detection 
15 6 No permition on job carrying 
16 8 Incorrect procedure 
17 19 Delay maintenance operations 
18 21 
HTHA degradation monitoring specified but not 
performed 
19 5 Inexperience 
20 18 
Wrong maintenance procedure (Nelson curve 
methodology) 
21 14 
Inadequate training of the inspectors to detect HTHA 
easily 
 
5.5 Correlation Analysis of Input Variables 
Correlation between input variables is a key consideration in ANN. A 
large number of available variables, correlations between them and absence of 
predictive power of some of them can result in problems such as long-time 
requirement and redundancy of data for network training. Selection of input 
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variables based on correlation analysis can improve the performance of ANN 
during training stage and its post-development application (May et al., 2011).  
Inputs ranking based on the Pearson correlation is suggested for input 
variable selection, where variables are graded by their correlation coefficients. 
The analysis is based on application of Eq.(7) to output (Y) and each available 
input variable (X) for determination of Pearson correlation coefficient (R) which 
value lies in the range from -1 to +1. The deviation of coefficient from 0 is the 
main criterion of correlation presence and choice of input variable for 
modelling. 
    
∑      ̅      ̅  
 
   
√∑      ̅  ∑      ̅   
 
    
 
   
           (7) 
In the current ANN model, correlation analysis of input variables is not 
included due to random nature of the generated data. The future development of 
the proposed methodology should consider actual process system variables (e.g., 
temperature, pressure, flowrate) and their correlations in system failure analysis.    
5.6 Interdependency Analysis between BEs/Inputs  
In this section, the ability of the ANN model of handling interdependent 
variables is studied. Firstly, all 21 BEs were ranked based on their level of 
contribution to the occurrence of TE using the data from Table 4.1. The 
following steps were performed and the results are given in Table 5.2: 
(1) The failure probability value of each BE was divided on the estimated RPB 
failure probability of 0.0842 and multiplied by 100%.  
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(2) The BEs contribution values were found by normalizing the result obtained 
for each BE in the first step. 
(3) The ranking of BEs was achieved based on the normalized contribution 
factors in the second step. 
Table 5.2 BEs ranking basing on the contribution factor 
Rank # 
Contribution 
factor 
BE # 
Assigned failure 
probability 
1 0.12658 BE13 0.09 
2 0.11674 BE7 0.083 
3 0.09283 BE20 0.066 
4 0.07736 BE15 0.055 
5 0.07032 BE3 0.05 
6 0.07032 BE12 0.05 
7 0.07032 BE16 0.05 
8 0.07032 BE17 0.05 
9 0.07032 BE19 0.05 
10 0.07032 BE21 0.05 
11 0.03516 BE1 0.025 
12 0.03516 BE14 0.025 
13 0.0211 BE2 0.015 
14 0.01406 BE5 0.01 
15 0.01406 BE6 0.01 
16 0.01406 BE9 0.01 
17 0.01406 BE10 0.01 
18 0.00703 BE8 0.005 
19 0.00703 BE18 0.005 
20 0.00141 BE4 0.001 
21 0.00141 BE11 0.001 
 
Secondly, we assumed that the BE and TE data given in Table 4.2 are 
actual site data and the FT model was built without the least contributory event 
(BE11 – “Insufficient instrumentation to measure process conditions”). The 
ANN model of the same architecture with 20 inputs was trained using 400 
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samples for the corresponding 20 BEs and the TE given in actual data set (Table 
4.2, in which TE data is generated based on all 21 BEs). The model performance 
of FT and ANN was checked by using 50 samples for 20 BE and comparing 
obtained results with actual data for TE. The predictive power was estimated by 
calculating the difference between the predicted TE value and its actual value.   
The results of simulations have shown better predictive performance of 
ANN with mean error value of 0.43% in comparison with 1.05% mean error of 
FT. The result indicates that the interdependencies among input variables can be 
considered by the ANN model; otherwise, the ANN model should have 
produced similar results with those of the FT model. However, it is worth noting 
that the performance of ANN model in handing the interdependency among 
inputs is highly linked to the amount and quality of data available for training. 
This was found by training the same ANN model with 20 inputs by using only 
50 samples. The results of simulations of obtained ANN model have shown 
larger errors in predictions with mean value of 3.69%.  
5.7 Performance Analysis of ANNs with Different Architectures 
The performance analysis of ANNs with different number of neurons in 
hidden layers was performed in order to test the rules proposed in Section 3.3. 
The training of each case with different combination of number of neurons in 
the hidden layers was performed using the same data set generated for 21 BEs 
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and TE.  Table 5.3 gives a summary of the mean and maximum differences 
between the outputs of the ANN model and the testing data.  
Table 5.3 Testing results of accident ANN models with different architectures 
Training 
data set 
volume 
  
Number of neurons 
in hidden layer 1 
18 14 10 7 7 7 
Number of neurons 
in hidden layer 2 
9 7 5 6 4 2 
50 Mean diff. [%] 21.35 23.23 4.89 22.41 23.62 20.12 
50 Maximum diff. [%] 92.31 96.79 26.53 92.4 92.68 91.31 
250 Mean diff. [%] 3.68 4.22 1.93 2.01 1.74 1.91 
250 Maximum diff. [%] 18.43 21.06 7.64 8.21 6.04 7.12 
450 Mean diff. [%] 1.91 2.12 2.11 0.96 0.77 1.00 
450 Maximum diff. [%] 7.36 10.13 16.62 4.93 3.07 3.67 
 
The obtained results shown in Table 5.3 show that the ANN model with 7 
and 4 neurons in the first and second hidden layers produces better results. This 
partially validates the rule-of-thumb proposed in Section 3.3. The results also 
confirm that the both appropriate ANN architecture and training data set volume 
would greatly influence on the model performance. It is worth nothing that the 
ANN model with another architecture could be built with better results of 
predictive performance if the training data set would be of larger size and better 
quality. 
 
 
 
54 
 
Chapter 6 – Conclusions 
6.1 Summary of Research Findings 
This thesis attempts to propose a methodology of mapping FT into ANN 
to support the development of ANN-based risk assessment model using FT as an 
informative basis. The association of ANN‟s architecture and configuration with 
the FT structure has been investigated. This study shows that FT is effective to 
help identifying proper input and output variables for the ANN model. The 
results also indicate that the ANN model could perform better if the numbers of 
neurons in its hidden layers were defined according to the numbers of 
intermediate events directly linked to the BEs and TE in the FT, from which the 
ANN was mapped. The availability of new data for training helps to improve the 
performance of the ANN model. The newly available data/information may lead 
to changes in the FT. This may result in the addition of new inputs in the 
developed ANN. This study shows that better mapping performance can be 
achieved by adopting the parameters of the developed network in the new 
network. The ANN model mapped from FT has demonstrated its strength and 
effectiveness as a risk assessment tool.  
6.2 Future work 
Future work will be devoted to improving the method by including 
process variables (e.g. temperature, pressure, flowrate, concentration) that can 
be monitored and recorded online and real-time in the ANN model. In this way, 
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we can utilize the large amount of process data for training and testing of the 
ANN model for system failure analysis. However, there is a need of 
investigation on the pre-processing of the data as the magnitude of ANN inputs 
of different scale can negatively affect on the ANN performance. The possible 
ways of avoiding of such cases is detection and removal of data samples “out” 
of the studied range and normalization of the input data. Additionally, the study 
of the use of different architectures, transfer function and training algorithms 
will be considered. Work in this direction is under progress.  
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